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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-PRIOR DISCHARGE WITHIN SIX YEARS AS BAR TO WAGE
EARNER'S EXTENSION PLAN-Appellant, a debtor, sought confirmation of a
wage earners' extension plan pursuant to Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act. 1 Section 656 prohibits confirmation of a plan under Chapter XIII if the
debtor would have been denied an ordinary discharge in bankruptcy had he
been seeking one.2 A discharge within six years prior to the date of filing constitutes a bar to such discharge. 3 The referee, finding that the debtor had obtained a discharge within six years, dismissed the proceedings. On appeal
from the district court's affirmance, held, affirmed. Since a wage earner's extension plan clearly contemplates a discharge of debts, confirmation is barred
under sections 656a and 14c(5) by a prior discharge within six years. In re
Schlageter, 319 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1963).
Wage earner plans, first provided for in the Chandler Act of 1938,4
differ from ordinary bankruptcy proceedings in that their aim is not liquidation of the debtor's estate, but application of future earnings to pay his
debts. 11 To commence a Chapter XIII proceeding the wage earner6 must
file a petition alleging that he is insolvent or unable to pay his debts as
they mature, and that he desires to effect a composition or extension, or
both, out of his future earnings.7 An extension contemplates payment in
full over an extended period of time, whereas a composition undertakes
1 Sections 601-86, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1958 &: Supp.
IV, 1963). See generally 10 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 531-742 (14th ed. 1962 &: Supp. 1962).
2 Section 656a provides: "The court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that . . • (3) the
debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which
would be a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt. •.." 52 Stat. 935 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1958).
a Section 14c provides: "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the
bankrupt • • . (5) in a proceeding under this Act commenced within six years prior to
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or had
a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way
of composition confirmed under this Act.•.." 52 Stat. 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 32(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
4 Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938).
IS The virtues of Chapter XIII wage earner plans have been extolled, from both a
moral and economic standpoint, in several legal publications. See generally Abramson,
A Comment on Habitual Proceedings, 37 REF. J. 94 (1963); Nadler, An Aid to Public
Relations: Help the Wage Earner Make Good-(Under Chapter Xlll), 64 CoM. L.J. 38
(1959); Riley, Chapter Xllls in the Madison Bankruptcy Court, 37 REF. J. 55 (1963).
However, for a vigorous argument against over-emphasizing wage earner plans, see
Walker, ls Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?, 33 REF. J. 7
(1959). But see Allgood, Chapter Xlll-Referee Allgood of Alabama Replies to Referee
Walker, 33 REF. J. 51 (1959).
6 Section 606 provides: " .•. (8) 'wage earner' shall mean an individual whose principal
income is derived from wages, salary or commissions." 64 Stat. 1134 (1950), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 1006 (Supp. IV, 1963).
7 Section 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1958). As a debtor need only be
"unable to pay his debts as they mature" he may be able to get a wage earner's extension
plan although he has sufficient non-exempt assets to allow his creditors to recover their
claims. See 15 STAN. L. R.Ev. 518, 521-22 (1963).
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only partial payment. Upon notice to all creditors the court calls a meeting,8 at which the debtor submits his plan, if it has not earlier been filed. 9
To be confirmed, the plan roust be approved by all secured creditors as
well as a majority of unsecured creditors; it roust also meet the requirements of section 656. 10 The plan need not satisfy section 656 if approved
by all creditors, both secured and unsecured. 11 If confirmed, the plan is
binding on both debtor and creditor,12 and if the debtor completes the
plan and payments thereunder the court will discharge him.18 He may also
be discharged after three years, although not having completed the payments, if his failure was due to circumstances for which he could not be held
accountable. 14
Section 656a(3) prohibits confirmation of a plan under Chapter XIII if
the debtor is guilty of any act that would constitute a bar to discharge
in a straight bankruptcy proceeding. A prior discharge within six years is
such an act. 15 The word "plan" is defined in section 606(7) 16 to include
a composition, extension, or both, and there is a further reference to this
definition in section 623. 17 A literal reading of the statute must therefore
result in a finding that confirmation of an extension plan will be denied
if the debtor has received a prior discharge in bankruptcy within six years.
It is settled that a prior discharge within six years bars the confirmation of
a Chapter XIII composition.18 The question is whether sections 14c(5) and
656a(3), in combination, similarly preclude the confirmation of an extension plan-in other words, whether or not the statute should be read
literally.
The view tl).at an extension is not barred by a prior discharge in bankruptcy within six years has been taken by two federal district courts in
Sections 632-33(2), 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1032-33(2) (1958).
The plan must meet the requirements of § 646, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C, § 1046
(1958). The plan "-may," but need not, deal with secured creditors.
10 Section 652, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958). A "majority" of unsecured
creditors means a majority both of the number of creditors and of the amount of claims
allowed.
11 Section 651, 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1051 (1958).
12 Section 657, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1057 (1958).
18 Section 660, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958).
14 Section 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958). Because of this section many
courts require that a Chapter XIII plan be capable of completion within three years,
although there is no statutory limit on the length of time a plan may run. See NADLER,
BANKRUPTCY 836 (1948).
15 A discharge, on its face, is not an act of guilt on the part of the debtor. See In -re
Goldberg, 53 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1931).
16 Section 606(7), 64 Stat. 1134 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (Supp. IV, 1963).
17 Section 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1958).
18 Section 14c(5) specifically lists confirmation of a Chapter XIII composition plan as
a bar to subsequent discharge within six years, and a discharge would bar confirmation
of a subsequent composition within the six-year period. In -re Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400
(2d Cir. 1933); cf. In -re Jenson, 200 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926
(1953) (alternative holding) (Chapter XI extension barred by prior discharge in bankruptcy).
8
9
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In re Mahaley 19 and In re Sharp. 2 Compositions and extensions were
there distinguished on the ground that the latter are not discharges since
they contemplate repayment of debts in full; however, compositions resemble discharges in that they involve a reduction of debts.21 Finding the
purpose of section l 4c(5)-prevention of the development of a class of
habitual users of the Bankruptcy Act22-to be generally inconsistent with
the purpose of Chapter XIII, which is to encourage extension plans,23 these
courts turned to section 602,24 which states that the provisions of Chapters
I through VII (which include section 14c(5)) do not apply if they are inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XIII. Having already distinguished
extensions and compositions, they were able to hold that section 14c(5) does
not apply to the confirmation of Chapter XIII extension plans without
having to say the same of compositions, which are clearly subject to the
six-year rule. The Mahaley-Sharp line of reasoning, therefore, avoids the
result of a literal interpretation of the statute by, in effect, reading a
proviso into section 656a(3) that section l 4c(5) shall not preclude the confirmation of an extension plan.
The principal case, which is the first federal court of appeals decision
holding that an extension plan is barred by a prior discharge within six
years,211 rejected the Mahaley-Sharp distinction between extension plans
and compositions. The court held that a discharge is clearly contemplated
by the statute in both types of plans; it therefore saw no reason to exempt
extensions from the six-year rule. The same conclusion was reached by a
federal district court in In re Bingham,26 where the court cited strong
187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
This distinction has been accepted by Congress. Prior to 1938 there was a split
among the courts as to whether compositions were subject to the six-year rule. In re
Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1933) (prior composition held to bar a discharge). Contra,
In re Goldberg, 53 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1931) (prior composition does not bar a composition).
In 1938 § 14c(5) was changed to include compositions as a cause of bar. In pointing out
that there was no need to include prior extensions in section 14c(5), H.R. REP. No. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1937), states that, as a composition under Chapter XIII acts as a
discharge, there is no reason not to treat it as such, but that an extension differs from a
composition in that it operates to pay debts in full. See also In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748
(10th Cir. 1962); In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp.
660 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), afj'd sub nom. Fishman v. Verlin, 255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958); In re
Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943). But see 15 STAN. L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1963),
for an argument that the distinction between extensions and compositions, though well
documented, is unrealistic because under either plan a debtor may reduce his obligations
to a certain extent..
22 See In re Sharp, 205 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
23 Id. at 787.
2-i 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958).
25 Edins v. Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc., 315 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1963), followed
the Mahaley-Sharp view in a brief per curiam opinion.
20 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bingham v. Yingling
Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961). In this case the debtor applied for confirmation of an extension plan, having received a prior confirmation of a Chapter XIII plan
within six years. The court was unclear as to whether the prior Chapter XIII plan was by
way of composition or extension. In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962), which in19
20
21
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policy reasons in favor of this result, namely, loss of interest to the creditors
for the duration of the plan and the danger that a secured creditor might
lose his security.27 The Bingham-Schlageter position is not without merit.
It may be undesirable in some circumstances to confirm as a matter of
course an extension plan within six years after a prior discharge.28 The most
common problem in allowing frequent extension plans is that the debtor
will allow himself to become perennially over-committed, the result being
the creation of a class of debtors habitually under the protection of the
Bankruptcy Act.29
Considering all the arguments, however, the Mahaley-Sharp position
seems to achieve a sounder result.80 Although those courts disregarded the
literal terms of the statute, their conclusion that extension plans should be
exempted from the six-year rule is so strongly supported by policy considerations as to justify the vague reasoning employed. In the majority of
cases, confirmation of an extension plan is desirable from both the debtors'
and the creditors' point of view. The debtor is free from the harassment
of garnishment and attachment by creditors while he attempts to repay his
debts in full. It has been said that by utilizing an extension plan the cost of
relief to the debtor is lowered, and he receives an education in budgeting
as well.81 Moreover, confirmation of such a plan is desirable from a creditor's
volved two consecutive extension plans, purported to overrule the Bingham case, stating
that the two cases involved "similar facts." See 47 IowA L. REv. 155 (1961), for a conclusion
that the prior plan in the Bingham case was by way of composition. This seems to be the
better explanation of the case.
The argument that a creditor may stand to lose his security must at least be qualified
by the fact that no plan can be confirmed under Chapter XIII without the acceptance of
all secured creditors whose claims are covered by the plan. See Kennedy, Hospitality for
Repeaters Under the Bankruptcy Act, 68 CoM. L.J. 117, 123 &: n.41 (1963).
27 In re Bingham, 190 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Bingham v. Yingling Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961).
28 There is a danger that the debtor may use the Chapter XIII extension plan as a
merely temporary measure to hold off unsecured creditors while the secured creditors
collect, then drop the proceeding or convert it into straight bankruptcy after having
paid off on property which will be exempted. See Walker, supra note 5, at 8. He may
also plan to get a release later under § 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958),
without having completed the plan.
29 See Walker, supra note 5; Wiese, Bankruptcy Discharge Does Not Prohibit Chapter
XIII Proceeding, 15 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 22 (1960); 15 STAN. L. REV. 518 (1963).
so Most writers seem to agree that wage earner extension plans should be freely
available, notwithstanding prior discharges. See Abramson, supra note 5; Nadler, supra
note 5; Riley, supra note 5. It has been uniformly held that successive Chapter XIII
extension plans are not subject to the six-year rule. In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th
Cir. 1962); In re Autry, 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kan. 1962).
81 Riley, supra note 5. See Kennedy, Debt Pooling Arrangements vs. Chapter XIII
Proceedings, 46 ILL. B.J. 816 (1958), reprinted in 32 REF. J. 109 (1958), for a conclusion
that, in an average case, the costs to the debtor of a Chapter XIII plan, are about equal to
those of private debt pooling; however, in the former case the fees incl?de compe~ent
legal aid to the debtor, while in the latter they do not. See also Mauhtz, Operations
Under Chapter XIII, 27 REF. J. 68 (1953), for examples of how wage earner plans in
Alabama have been made more economical.
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point of view in most cases.32 Illustratively, a man's creditors stand to gain
very little if the debtor loses his job as a result of garnishment. Nor is the
loss of interest to creditors nearly so severe as is the case when a debtor
receives an ordinary discharge in bankruptcy.33
The trend in recent years has been toward a wider use of extension
plans,34 especially since the wage limit on eligibility for Chapter XIII plans
was removed in 1959. The question of the six-year rule, therefore, becomes
more significant in the face of the need for a rule that will insure maximum
availability of Chapter XIII extension plans to the wage earner. In recognition of this need, the National Bankruptcy Conference has approved
amendments to sections l 4c(5) 315 and 656a(3) 36 which would, in effect,
codify the Mahaley-Sharp view. 37
If, however, extension plans are to be made freely available to wage
earners, the courts must remain alert to possible abuses. Perhaps the best
safeguard is found in section 656,38 which provides that a plan cannot be
confirmed unless it is submitted in good faith and in the best interests of
the creditors. 39 Another safeguard consists of the creditors themselves, as no
Chapter XIII plan may be confirmed without the consent of all the secured
creditors and a majority of the unsecured creditors whose claims are covered
by the plan. 40 When courts discover after confirmation that debtors have
entered upon extension plans intending to use them merely as a means to
hold their creditors at bay,41 these plans could be dismissed pursuant to
See generally Allgood, supra note 5; Riley, supra note 5.
Under Chapter XIII plans creditors collect a far greater proportion of what is
owed them than in straight bankruptcy proceedings. In 1962 asset bankruptcy cases (in
which creditors collect far more than in non-asset or nominal asset cases), the total
payments to creditors were only $52,404,479 out of $274,834,940 total indebtedness, or
19.l %, Comparatively, in Chapter XIII proceedings $6,344,660 was paid to creditors
holding $6,555,129 in claims allowed-about 97% satisfaction. ADMINIS'IRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS FOR PERIOD ENDING
JUNE 30, 1962.
34 Decreases were reported in all types of bankruptcy proceedings in 1962 except
those filed under Chapter XII (real estate arrangements) and Chapter XIII. Chapter XII
proceedings increased 19.3%, but only from 31 to 37 cases. Chapter XIII proceedings
showed an increase from 19,723 to 22,880 cases, an increment of 16,0%, Comparatively,
there was an increase of only 1137 cases, or 0.8% in all other types of bankruptcy proceedings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 7.
315 See Proceedings of Nat'l Bankruptcy Conf. Ann. Meeting, Oct. 25-26, 1962, p. 11, cited
in Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124. The amendment excepts discharges on completion of
extension plans under § 660, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958), from the six-year
rule. The implication is that a discharge on completion of a composition under § 660,
and any discharge under § 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958), would be
treated as a regular discharge, subject to the six-year rule. See Kennedy, supra note 26.
36 Summary of Proceedings of Nat'l Bankruptcy Conf. 1961 Ann. Meeting, Res. No. 2,
cited in Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124.
37 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124.
38 Sections 656a(2), (4), 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1056(a)(2), (4) (1958).
39 Compare 15 STAN. L. REv. 518, 523 (1963), for a speculation that In re Sharp may
create a norm of confirming Chapter XIII extension plans without regard to prior discharges, compositions, or extensions.
40 Section 652, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958).
H See text accompanying note 28 supra. It has been suggested that the courts should
82
88
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section 671. 42 Perhaps the greatest ·fear among those who oppose the exemption of extension plans from the six-year rule is that this will expand the
class of perennially over-committed wage earners who are constantly under
the protection of the courts. Such a possibility may be mitigated by setting
a statutory limit on the number of extension plans available to the debtor.
The court may also find a plan submitted by a debtor who has filed for
relief an extensive number of times not to be in the best interests of the
creditors. Despite some risk of abuse, these safeguards would appear sufficiently reliable to justify adherence to the policy of making extension plans
available without the burdening limitation of the six-year rule.
Anthony Lynch

treat a plan calling for the rejection of the debtor's ex.ecutory contracts (pursuant to
§§ 642, 646(~. 52 Stat. 933, 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1042, 1046(6) (1958) as a composition
and therefore subject to the six-year rule. See 15 STAN. L. REv. 518 (1963). It is claimed that
such a procedure would make the distinction between ex.tensions and compositions more
realistic because an ex.tension plan which calls for the rejection of executory contracts tends
to reduce the debtor's total obligations. This rationale for distinguishing this type of ex.ten•
sion plan is not convincing. Pursuant to § 642, the debtor will have to pay reasonable
damages to those whose contracts are rejected, and therefore the party whose executory
contract is rejected is compensated for any loss he may sustain.
42 Section 671 provides that a plan may be dismissed for fraud in its procurement.
52 Stat. 937 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1071 (1958). Perhaps the construction of the word "fraud"
could be expanded to reach debtors who do not intend to complete their extension plans.

